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1. Introduction 
 
This paper addresses important changes in innovation patterns in the upstream 
petroleum industry over the period from the 1970s to 2005. It argues that the shifts in 
patterns of innovation over that period can be explained by the dynamics of knowledge 
base complexity (KBC). A knowledge base is defined as complex if it involves 
integration and combination of different scientific and technological disciplines and 
requires a variety of competences (such as R&D, design, engineering and production). 
We develop a quantitative method to explore KBC and show that increasing KBC has 
shifted innovation patterns, from a broadly Schumpeter Mark I to a ‘modified’ form of 
Schumpeter Mark II, led less by the established oil majors, but by a new class of 
integrated service companies. 
 
The petroleum industry has a relatively long and complicated value chain, beginning 
with exploration and production of crude oil, to transport, refining and retail. The 
upstream industry comprises a set of related activities related to: oil and gas exploration, 
together with heavy oil, condensates and tar sands; developing reserves for extraction, 
production over an extended lifetime; and finally decommissioning after depletion. It 
includes the business activities supporting and supplying these main activities, including 
for marine, sub-sea, and complex geo- activities. 
 
While the notion of technological regimes has proved powerful in explaining inter-
sectoral differences in sectoral patterns of innovation, the analysis of the relationship 
between technological regimes and patterns of innovation at different stages of 
development of a given industry remains rather unexplored (Krafft et al., 2014). Our 
research aims to show how the changing nature of the sectoral patterns of innovation is 
intrinsically related with the dynamics of technological regimes. We provide a threefold 
contribution. First, we propose a dynamic reading of the concept of technological 
regimes and analyse structural transformation within the upstream petroleum sector 
over time. Second, we conceptualize and put the notion of KBC at the centre of our 
analytical framework. Third, we propose a quantitative method using patent data in order 
to capture the dynamics of KBC and their relationship with Schumpeterian patterns of 
innovation. We empirically test these ideas in the upstream petroleum industry focusing 
on changes in technological opportunities and KBC. 
 
The novelty of our study consists of its focus on the dynamic relationship between KBC 
and the evolution of sectoral patterns of innovation. Most other works on technological 
regimes are in a static cross-sectoral mode which ignores the important role of change 
in the nature of knowledge for industrial dynamics. However, the recent study by Krafft 
et al (2014) provides evidence regarding the relationship between change in knowledge 
base characteristics and industry structure in the pharmaceutical industry. 
 
Our study shows three distinct periods of technological innovation in upstream 
petroleum. The first period, to the end of the 1970s, was characterised by a rising trend 
of investment seeking advanced technology to diversify supply sources in more 
challenging reservoirs in the wake of the first and second oil shocks. We show that this 
period is characterised by a rapid rise in patents which can be explained by upstream 
factors driven by high oil prices. We characterise this period as a Schumpeterian Mark I 
type dynamic characterised by creative destruction where new firms play a major role in 
innovative activities and barriers to entry are low. 
 
The second period, from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s, was characterised by oil price 
cuts. Low oil prices seemed to act as a disincentive for innovation in the industry. As a 
result, patenting in upstream petroleum industry stagnated. Major companies 
restructured whilst new smaller specialised supply and service companies expanded 
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due to the outsourcing strategies adopted by many operators. The period, we find, 
shows a gradual shift in innovation patterns away from Schumpeter Mark I type weakly 
towards what resembles Mark II - where large firms increasingly play a major role in 
technological activities and it becomes challenging for new small innovators to enter. 
 
The third period has a more complex dynamic, but with major implications. The sharply 
upwards trend in innovation from 1994, was not driven by higher oil prices, which did not 
increase for a further six years. Our data suggest that the emerging pattern in this period 
in upstream petroleum industry is not a typical Schumpeter Mark II, but a modified 
version of it, because established oil operators did not have a strong influence on this 
concentrated innovation pattern. Instead, a new class of agents (integrated service 
companies) led the sector towards a ‘modified’ Schumpeter Mark II. 
 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents a dynamic reading of the concept 
of technological regimes and explores the knowledge gaps in the literature. In section 3 
we introduce our method, showing how we measure technological opportunities, KBC, 
and dynamics of sectoral patterns of innovation. Section 4 presents our results, focusing 
on dynamics of technological opportunities, knowledge base complexities and 
Schumpeterian patterns of innovation. We then discuss the relationship between 
Schumpeterian patterns of innovation and the dynamics of KBC. Section 5 summarises 
our findings and concludes. 
 
2. Literature Survey 
 
We review three related bodies of relevant literature: on the Schumpeterian patterns of 
innovation; dynamics of technological regimes; and on complexity. 
 
2.1 Schumpeterian patterns 
 
In the Schumpeterian tradition, the distinction between Mark I and II has proved a useful 
analytical tool to distinguish different sectoral patterns of innovation among different 
industrial sectors. In this article, we ask whether the Schumpeterian dichotomy is a 
useful analytical tool to understand whether, how and why patterns of innovation differ in 
the same industry over time. Our intuition is that the innovation patterns and knowledge 
accumulation in one industry may gradually change as a result of technical change and 
the associated division of labour. As an industry evolves, its knowledge base can move 
to higher orders of complexity which involves both higher differentiation and requires 
greater integration capacity, creating a shift in the Schumpeterian pattern. 
 
Schumpeter Mark I is characterized by creative destruction where new firms play a 
major role in innovative activities and barriers to entry are low. In contrast, creative 
accumulation is the main characteristic of Schumpeter Mark II, and established firms 
play a major role in technological activities whilst it is challenging for new small 
innovators to enter (Schumpeter 1934, 1942). Authors such as Malerba and Orsenigo 
(1995, 1996, and 1997), Breschi et al. (2000) and Malerba (2007) found empirical 
support for the existence and significance of these patterns. 
 
Notwithstanding those key findings, these studies suffer from two limitations. First, the 
methodology employed does not allow for the observation of variations within 
technological classes and industries, because the analysis relies on aggregated data. 
Second, it does not allow for the observation of temporal variation in sectoral patterns of 
innovation within industries, because the time dimension is removed. So while it is 
widely accepted that patterns of innovation change over time, observations are based 
on average behaviour over time for specific technology fields (Malerba and Orsenigo, 
1996). 
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These limitations have been partly addressed in more recent studies. For example, 
Corrocher et al. (2007) observed the co-existence of both Schumpeterian patterns of 
innovation in the ICT industry. Grebel et al. (2007) provided similar evidence, stressing 
the co-existence of large diversified and new technology firms within innovation 
networks in knowledge intensive industries like biotechnology and telecommunications. 
 
Addressing the second limitation, Malerba and Orsenigo (1996) explicitly acknowledged 
the possibility of change in the nature of technological regimes over the course of time: 
 
‘Some of these features of knowledge may change during the evolution of a specific 
sector or technology (degree of codification, independence, and complexity)’ (p. 97). 
 
Malerba and Orsenigo (2000) and Malerba (2005) also argued that analysis of the 
knowledge base is a key requirement to develop an in-depth understanding of the 
innovative dynamics within sectors. Malerba (2006) added that ‘change in knowledge 
and knowledge base […] goes to the heart of the evolution of the industries and of the 
factors affecting the change in industrial structure’ (p. 14-15). However, such change 
was conceived as very difficult to identify over significant periods of time even in the 
case of single sectors, let alone the identification of regularities across a range of 
industrial sectors. 
 
2.2 Technological regimes in a dynamic perspective 
 
The notion of technological regimes was introduced by Nelson and Winter (1982), 
referring to the knowledge environment in which firms operate, or in which their problem-
solving activities take place. More recently, four building blocks were identified: 
technological opportunity, the appropriability of innovations, their cumulativeness, and 
knowledge base properties (Breschi and Malerba, 2000; Breschi et al., 2000). We focus 
on the co-evolution between technological opportunities and knowledge base properties. 
Technological opportunities refer to the likelihood of innovation in a particular sector 
resulting from a given investment in search processes. Over the industry life cycle (ILC), 
technological opportunities may significantly change suggesting its dynamic nature. The 
standard ILC model assumes that opportunity conditions decrease when industries 
mature (Klepper, 1996). However, some empirical statistical analysis (McGahan and 
Silverman, 2001), case studies in mature industries (Acha and Brusoni 2005) and 
research on innovation in low-tech industries (Robertson et al., 2009; Mendonça, 2009; 
Hirsch-Kreinsen, et al., 2006; Von Tunzelmann and Acha; 2005) show that this is not 
necessarily the case. 
 
The properties of the knowledge base which shape innovative activities constitute a 
synthetic construct encompassing the degree of specificity, tacitness, complexity and 
independence. Specificity refers to the scope of applications of particular knowledge 
domain. Tacitness refers to the extent to which knowledge is not articulated in standard 
formats such as blue prints. Degree of independence refers to the extent to which 
knowledge that is relevant to innovative activities can be separated. Like other 
dimensions of technological regimes, these properties of the knowledge base can 
change over time as a result of new application, inter-industry knowledge flows, 
codification practices (Steinmueller, 2000), and new instrumentation and computational 
capabilities (Arora and Gambardella, 1994). 
 
Changes in one or more of these dimensions of technological regime are likely to have 
important implications for sectoral patterns of innovation (Malerba and Orsenigo, 1995; 
1996; 1997; Malerba, 2007). We test this intuition in the upstream petroleum industry 
with particular emphasis on the dynamics of KBC. From the perspective of literature on 
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technological regimes (Malerba and Orsenigo, 1997; Breschi and Malerba, 2000), a 
knowledge base is defined as complex if (a) it involves integration and combination of 
different scientific and technological disciplines and (b) requires a variety of 
competences (such as R&D, design and engineering, and production) for innovative 
activities. So far, the role of KBC has been comprehensively addressed only by a few 
studies, including Vale and Caldeira (2008) investigation of the footwear industry and 
Iizuka (2009) account of structural change in the Chilean salmon farming industry. 
 
2.3 Complexity 
 
The concept of complexity has several distinctive types and definitions. A key concern of 
scholars writing on complexity (Wang and von Tunzelmann, 2000; Antonelli, 2011) is the 
volume of interdependencies and degree of interaction between elements of a system. 
This specific notion of knowledge complexity matters when ‘the opportunities to 
generate new knowledge are conditional on the identification and integration of the 
diverse bits of complementary knowledge that are inputs into the knowledge production 
process’ (Antonelli, 2003, p.507). This kind of complexity contributes to shape industrial 
dynamics since the recombination of both pre-existing and new bits of knowledge is key 
for the generation of new knowledge and introduction of systemic innovations 
(Chesbrough and Teece, 1996). 
 
Knowledge indivisibility is the outcome of a process whereby systemic knowledge 
serves new functions which are not achievable by individual bits of knowledge. In 
sectors with high levels of such complexity, successful innovation is not possible without 
a full understanding of the compatibilities and complementarities of diverse 
technologies. Because the source of this complexity is often systemic innovation 
(Chesbrough and Teece, 1996), we label this type of complexity as systemic complexity. 
 
3. Method 
 
Our method rests on integrating three related approaches: patent analysis to measure 
the dynamics of technological opportunities; measures of KBC; and measures of 
sectoral patterns of innovation. 
 
3.1 Measures of technological opportunities 
 
We analyse the transformations of sectoral innovation systems in upstream petroleum 
using the Derwent Innovating Index, the patent database which classifies all upstream 
petroleum industry patents in class H01. This class covers exploration, drilling, well 
services and stimulations, production and their sub segments of the upstream petroleum 
industry. In order to avoid double counting, we rely on the records of Derwent 
International Patent Families (IPFs) which group similar inventions registered in different 
territories. This is to avoid multiple counting of the same invention registered in different 
countries. Patent counts are used as a proxy to capture of the dynamics of the 
innovative performance. 
 
Patent data is the only rigorously classified information on technological innovation 
covering both long time periods and a wide range of countries. The advantages and 
limitations of patent data for the analysis of innovative activities is a widely discussed 
issue in the literature. It is particularly important to consider the limitations and 
disadvantages such as systematic biases in the data which may produce distorted 
results, if they are not treated properly. The main disadvantages include (Pavitt, 1985; 
Griliches, 1990; OECD, 2009): (i) Not all inventions are legally patentable everywhere. 
The classic example is software which in many countries is protected by copyright. 
Moreover, the patenting scope may differ from one country to another depending on 
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their particular patent law; (ii) Because of different institutional structures in different 
countries which affect the length, time and effectiveness of protection, an inventor’s 
incentive to file for patents vis-à-vis use other forms of protection varies substantially; 
and (iii) Propensity to patent varies across industries. 
 
While patents are only imperfect measures of innovation order, our results are less 
affected because the conclusions in this study are based on the analysis of trends rather 
than absolute levels of the variables. Therefore, we do not expect imperfections to 
significantly impact on trend analysis. 
 
Following previous studies, such as Andersen (2005); Park and Lee (2006) and Fai 
(2007), we use patenting growth rate to capture the dynamics of technological 
opportunities in upstream petroleum. We employ variation in patenting rate to examine 
how technological opportunities change over time. This analysis contributes to the 
understanding both of sources of variance in technological opportunities as well as its 
impact on industry performance as measured by R&D intensity and productivity 
(Klevorick et al., 1995). 
 
3.2 Measurement of Knowledge Base Complexity 
 
Here we explore how the level of KBC changes over the ILC. We aim to understand how 
the level of KBC evolves over different periods and how major innovators cope with its 
dynamics. 
 
According to the definition introduced in section 2.3, proxies to measure complexity 
should consider the links and interactions between different elements of the knowledge 
base and capture the recombinant nature of knowledge. In order to measure systemic 
complexity, network representation of the knowledge base is very relevant. According to 
this view (Saviotti, 2011; Krafft and Quatraro, 2011), the knowledge base has a co-
relational structure comprised of nodes and links between these nodes. Nodes are 
technology classes and links represent relationships between technologies connecting 
nodes together. The measure of systemic complexity should consider the structure of 
relationships between different knowledge domains. The dynamics of complexity are 
understood from changes in the pattern and strength of linkages and interactions 
between the nodes. 
 
Network analysis indicators treat knowledge as an integrated system in which both the 
building blocks of the system (nodes) and their interactions (ties) are investigated at the 
same time. This enables us to monitor how the knowledge structure changes over time 
when new technologies emerge, diffuse and are integrated in the system or the old ones 
expire, are abandoned or disconnected from the knowledge base (Krafft and Quatraro, 
2011). 
 
In social Network Analysis (SNA) a matrix of co-occurrence of technological classes is 
formed to represent the knowledge network where the value of each cell is the number 
of inventions for which two technological classes appear joined together (Krafft and 
Quatraro, 2011). Among various measures available to describe the network 
connectivity and structure of the knowledge base, network density is one of the most 
used. It considers the total number of links in a system as a proportion of the total 
number of possible links between nodes. However the weakness of this measure is that 
it does not consider the strength of the nodes and links, and treats weak and strong links 
equally (Krafft and Quatraro, 2011). From previous research, we know that distribution 
of the links is highly unequal. A few nodes are very central and highly connected, while 
many others have very weak linkages or are isolated (Saviotti, 2011). 
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The degree of centrality of a node is used as one of the centrality measures, describing 
how strong is the level of connectivity of a node (Krafft and Quatraro, 2011). Formally, 
the following equation expresses the measure of degree of centrality (DC): 
                                                                                                               
 
 
 
Where n represents the nodes and l represent the links. 
 
The degree of centrality is defined as the number of links of one node with other nodes 
of the network. Because this measure is affected by the network size, it is often divided 
by its maximum value to provide a normalized proxy (Krafft and Quatraro, 2011), as 
shown in the following equation: 
 
                                      
 
 
This normalization allows for comparability of the degree centrality over time and 
analysis of dynamics of systemic complexity, because the size of the knowledge 
network changes over time. Degree of centrality characterises a single node, not the 
network. To create a measure of connectivity at the level of a network, we rely on the 
average of the degree of centrality of all nodes of the network. Following (Krafft and 
Quatraro, 2011), we used the average measure of degree of centrality, weighted by 
relative frequency. This takes into account the highly unequal strength of the nodes, 
giving higher weights to important technological classes. Accordingly, the measure of 
systemic complexity of the knowledge base is weighted average degree centrality 
(WADC), as follows: 
 
                                              
 
 
When the speed of formation of new nodes outweighs the formation of links, the network 
becomes less connected and systemic complexity (WADC) decreases. In contrast, 
when the formation of new links is stronger than the appearance of new nodes in the 
knowledge network, network connectivity increases (Saviotti, 2011), signalling the rise of 
systemic complexity (WADC). 
 
3.3 Measurement of sectoral patterns of innovation 
 
The indicators selected for the analysis of the dynamics of sectoral patterns of 
innovation are based on previous studies (Malerba and Orsenigo, 1996; 1997; Breschi 
and Malerba 2000). They are: concentration of innovative activities (C); the number of 
innovative firms (F); share of new entries (NE) to the innovation system in terms of the 
proportion of patents registered by new innovators. 
 
Although the variables of this inter-temporal research are similar to previous cross-
sectoral studies, their operational correspondence with archetypical Schumpeterian 
patterns of innovation is interpreted differently. Due to the dynamic nature of the 
analysis, we are more interested in the variables’ trends than in their values in cross-
sectional designs. In other words, our interpretation is based on relative change (of the 
variables) over time, indicating whether at different points in time upstream petroleum 
was moving closer to a typical Mark I or Mark II type. 
 
 
= (1) 
NDCn = / (2) 
WADC = (3) 
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4. Results 
 
Our results are compiled in five sub-sections: our periodization of trends of technological 
opportunities; the dynamics of KBC over those periods; the consequences of that 
complexity; the dynamics of Schumpeterian patterns of innovation; and the resulting 
changes in sectoral patterns of innovation. 
 
4.1 The trend of technological opportunities 
 
Following previous studies, such as Andersen (2005); Park and Lee (2006) and Fai 
(2007), we use patenting growth rate to capture the dynamics of technological 
opportunities in upstream petroleum. We employ variation in patenting rate to examine 
how technological opportunities change over time. 
 
Figure 1 presents the innovation trend in the upstream petroleum industry according to 
the number of patent applications in the US Patent Office (solid line). The dash-line 
shows the trend of total patenting in USPTO at 1% scale to control for changes in the 
overall level of patenting. That is, to examine whether observed dynamics of innovation 
is a reflection of technology push from other sectors, or the result of internal 
mechanisms within the upstream petroleum industry. 
 
According to figure 1, the dynamics of innovation in upstream petroleum presents three 
distinct periods over the last four decades. From the early 1970s until mid-1980s, we 
observe a growing trend where the number of US patent applications almost doubled 
from about 700 per year in 1970 to about 1450 in 1984 (p1). The second period runs 
from 1984 to 1994, with a negative trend in innovation (p2). The third period begins after 
1994 when the industry grows and looks very innovative (p3). 
 
Figure 1: the number of US patent applications over time 
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The first period corresponds to the first and second oil shocks driven by a wave of 
petroleum nationalization in Arab countries, Iranian revolution and increasing oil 
consumption which pushed up oil prices. These events provided powerful motives for 
upstream R&D investment seeking advanced technology in order to diversify supply 
sources. The aim was to open up more reservoirs in harsh locations and the key was 
technology. These technological efforts were enormously successful to bring down 
exploration and production (E&P) costs and increase reserve replacement ratios 
(Fagan, 1997). The stable trend of total patenting (dash line) in this period also suggests 
that the rise of innovation is not attributable to this overall global innovation trend and 
should be explained according to upstream industry-specific factors. 
 
Technological progress consequently led to excessive supply, pushing down oil prices 
for more than one and a half decades. Patenting took a negative trend from the mid-
1980s to the mid-1990s. The second period shows about a 15% decline in upstream 
innovation while total global patent applications move in the opposite direction 
expressing a growth of more than 70% over the period. This suggests that low oil prices 
acted as a disincentive for innovation. 
 
The collapse of oil prices in mid 1980s was a major driver for industry restructuring and 
emergence of new industry architecture. As a result of sustained low oil prices, oil 
majors implemented cost reduction programs to increase their efficiency. Fluctuations 
around the average low prices drove them to change their cost structure from fixed to 
variable. They chose to lease many types of equipment from previously owned service 
companies. The aim was to increase flexibility and responsiveness to change (Weston 
and Johnson, 1999). This created a massive opportunity for supply and service 
companies to takeover some activities previously conducted by operators. Technological 
progress in the industry and the need for specialization was another key driver. 
 
The 1986 counter shock was a key turning point for oil service companies, pushing them 
towards horizontal and vertical integration strategies (Babusiaux et al., 2004). Similar to 
established operators, faced with a declining market in the second half of the 1980s, 
service companies also restructured themselves in order to increase efficiency. They 
redefined their portfolios, focusing on what they considered their main expertise, selling 
less relevant units. An external growth strategy was also undertaken by smaller 
specialized service companies in drilling and geophysical services (Barreau, 2002). The 
result was the relative expansion of specialized supply and service companies in the 
sector. 
 
The third period is more complicated to analyse. While there was no major oil price 
changes until 2002, nor any technology-push trend (see the dash line in the figure 1) 
compared to the second period, the innovation performance of the industry increased 
dramatically. The number of patent applications in upstream petroleum grew about 
170%, meaning that the period saw an explosion of the search space for new 
technologies in spite of the fact that oil prices remained low. 
 
The innovation trend in upstream petroleum took a sharp upward trend after 1994, while 
oil prices begun to increase roughly 6 years later. Technology push contributed to 
explain this radical shift but it is not sufficient to explain the radical shift in innovative 
performance, that is from negative 15% growth rate in the second period to positive 
170% growth over the third period (see figure 1). 
 
We suggest that a combination of demand side factors (for innovative solutions) and 
change in industry architecture contributed to this dramatic change. Firstly, the cost of 
finding and lifting oil began to rise after 1995 (U.S. EIA, 2011), signalling that oil 
extraction was becoming an increasingly challenging business. Also, the provision of 
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equipment, design services and engineering services in upstream projects must adapt to 
the geological location and geophysical characteristics of the reservoir such as the 
shape, size, temperature, and type of rocks. Over time, easy to access reservoirs 
became depleted and companies had to deal with more difficult, less-accessible 
locations and more challenging conditions for extraction. Advanced and complex 
technology became a matter of survival, not just a tool for higher profits (U.S. EIA, 
2011). 
 
However, the industry architecture was mostly formed by operators and specialized 
service companies, which meant that it was not optimally structured to cope with the 
new technological imperatives of the sector (Chafcouloff et al., 1995). Given low oil 
prices and limited resources for innovation, a more efficient industry architecture was 
required to increase productivity and more quickly generate new technologies. Some 
major supply and service companies (such as Schlumberger, Halliburton, Baker 
Hughes, Weatherford) gradually began to provide a broad range of services to meet 
their client’s expanding needs for bigger and more complex exploration and 
development projects. This trend had already begun towards the end of second period. 
The ‘integrated solution’ gained momentum as customer-relationship strategies when 
operators requested more packaged services instead of task-specific activities (Barreau, 
2002). This increasing demand for integrated services pushed big supply and service 
companies to build project management and integration capabilities, previously the 
territory of major oil operators. 
 
This third stage of evolution stemmed from the second phase, triggered by a search for 
a fuller degree of integration and exploitation of interactions and synergies between 
different activities. Near the turn of the century from 1998 to 2001, service and supply 
industry experienced mega mergers in which very big companies expanded their size 
while at the same time refocusing their activities. Such changes under continuous low oil 
prices had some distinguishing features. First, the scale of acquired assets was much 
larger. Second, the scope of integration encompassed several service segments for 
major service companies. The overall result was an unprecedented record of industry 
consolidation, similar to major oil operator consolidation in the same period (Barreau, 
2002). 
 
Larger scale M&A activities moved the sector to a more concentrated industry structure 
which can be interpreted as an organizational industry-wide response to the new 
technological imperatives (Teece and Armour 1976). Industrial restructuring spurred a 
wave of innovative solutions. Overall, the service intensity of E&P activities and their 
knowledge content significantly increased over time, which led Rajan (2011) to observe 
that ‘if all technological innovations produced by the oil and gas industry were added up, 
they would probably rival NASA’s space program or the Industrial Revolution.’(p. 11) 
 
In sum, changes in industry architecture express three different phases after 1970 in 
parallel with innovation trends. The first phase is the period of oil shocks when operators 
have a dominant role and actively invest in technology. The second phase is the period 
of collapse of oil prices when limitation of R&D investments pushed down innovative 
activities. This triggered M&A activities among majors and service companies, and at 
the same time accelerated outsourcing strategies. The result was the relative expansion 
of specialized supply and service companies. The third phase saw the gradual 
emergence of new large service companies and a sharp increase in innovative activities 
is observable. 
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4.2 The dynamics of knowledge base complexity 
 
The dynamics of KBC in the upstream petroleum industry are presented in figure 2 using 
the WADC measure. 
 
The trend of systemic complexity over most of the first period (p1) is downward, which 
indicates decreasing connectivity within the knowledge network. This process is driven 
by a higher rate of creation of new nodes (or new technological classes), compared to 
new links between new and existing nodes (Saviotti, 2011). In this phase, the sector is 
mostly in its random search period and exploration strategy is dominant. Because the 
structure of the knowledge base is changing and is not yet established, both cognitive 
barriers to entry and the degree of knowledge cumulativeness are relatively low. 
 
Figure 2: Dynamics of the three dimensions of KBC in the upstream petroleum industry 
 
 
Historically, this was the period of rapid technological progress, when existing 
technologies (like 3-D seismic and horizontal drilling) were first introduced. When new 
promising technological fields are explored, it takes time for innovators to understand 
the complementarity and the relationships between new and existing knowledge 
domains. The high technical risks involved in new knowledge domains may also prevent 
innovators from exploring possible complementarities and productive links, before 
emergence of a relatively clear picture regarding the trajectory and potential of the new 
technologies. The emergence of new technologies may be expected to create new but 
poorly connected nodes, and temporarily reduce the systemic connectivity of the 
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knowledge network (Saviotti, 2011). The first period in upstream petroleum reflects this 
proposition. 
 
The situation began to change when the direction of systemic complexity reversed in the 
beginning of the second period (p2) in 1986, as connectivity within the knowledge 
network increased. This trend continued almost up to the end of p3. The diffusion and 
establishment of new technological fields explored in p1 contributes to explain the 
changing overall pattern in p3, when the rate of creation of new links overtakes the rate 
of emergence of new nodes. It does not imply that the emergence of new technological 
domains stopped; however their relative size became negligible compared to the 
established technological fields. 
 
By the end of p1 and during p2, the most promising fields had become known to the 
industry’s incumbents. Historically, this is when integrated service companies began to 
emerge. As it was difficult for established operators to manage the increasing range of 
specialized sub-contractors in different technical domains and coordinate the 
technological interfaces, integrated service companies took this role. They introduced 
total and integrated solutions combing different related technologies in unified packages 
(Barreau, 2002; Chafcouloff et al., 1995). Following Krafft and Quatraro (2011) and 
Krafft et al. (2014), we argue that search strategies gradually became organized rather 
than being random. Explorative behaviour was gradually replaced by exploitative 
strategies applied in the most productive technological areas. Innovation increasingly 
happened within technological classes which proved promising and fruitful, with a lower 
dispersion of R&D investment across fields. As a result of emergent complementarities, 
the knowledge base of the sector is not easily divisible or decomposable. The rise of 
knowledge network connectivity over most of p2 reflects these dynamics. 
 
The post 2002 decline in WADC seems odd, but still compatible with our theoretical 
argument. It resembles a period of technological discontinuity whereby the speed of new 
links in knowledge networks fall behind new nodes, so knowledge connectivity declines. 
We suggest such change a trend is a consequence of the fact that information about 
knowledge links is delayed (in the data set) compared to information about the nodes. In 
other words, systemic innovations which result from combinations (links) of previous 
innovations (nodes) appear later. 
 
4.3 The Consequences of Knowledge Base Complexity 
 
During the early phases (p1 and early p2) of the ILC, the complementarities between 
new and old knowledge domains were not fully explored and knowledge linkages were 
not fully operational. Access to a wide range of complementary knowledge was not 
necessary for the innovation process. Therefore, we expect to observe an increasing 
role for new entrants relative to the role of big and established companies (or otherwise 
knowledge integrators) in the organization of innovation processes, and the sector to 
behave as a Schumpeter Mark I pattern. 
 
When systemic complexity increased in periods 2 and 3, the sector moved towards a 
more organized search period and exploitative strategies became more pervasive (Krafft 
et al., 2011). Core technological domains were realized, technological trajectories were 
relatively clear and most productive complementarities and technical interdependencies 
were explored by industry participants. Innovative companies which connect and 
integrate different bits of knowledge were able to benefit from economies of scale and 
scope in both knowledge generation and exploitation processes. Cognitive barriers for 
small specialised companies are relatively higher, because successful innovation 
involves combination and recombination of various knowledge domains creating higher 
levels of cumulativeness. 
INNOGEN Working Paper 116                                                    January 2016 
 
Ali Maleki, Alessandro Rosiello and David Wield  14 
High systemic complexity presents strategic advantages for technologically diversified 
actors that occupy central positions in the knowledge networks, compared to marginal 
players (Antonelli, 2003). As a result, more knowledgeable incumbents are expected to 
be better placed to benefit from cross-fertilization between different knowledge domains 
and their wide range of applications. The entry barriers for new companies tend to be 
higher and growth opportunities for small ones are limited. As a result, we expect that 
the sector will move towards a Schumpeter Mark II pattern. These propositions are 
examined next. 
 
4.4 Dynamics of Schumpeterian patterns of innovation in upstream petroleum 
 
In this section, we analyse the sectoral pattern of innovation. Following the extant 
literature (Malerba and Orsenigo, 1996; 1997; Breschi et al., 2000), we use a set of 
variables to examine how the sector evolved over the three periods (see section 3.3). 
Unlike in previous research, these variables are employed in an inter-temporal mode of 
analysis to explore the shift of a sector’s (upstream petroleum) patterns of innovation 
over time. Our analysis relies on quantitative data. Due to the dynamic nature of the 
analysis, our analysis is based on relative change (of the variables) over time, indicating 
whether at different points in time upstream petroleum was moving closer to a typical 
Mark I or to a typical Mark II type. 
 
Table 1: Expected Schumpeterian Patterns of Innovation in a Dynamic Perspective 
 
 
 
Table 1 summarizes the archetypical Schumpeterian patterns of innovation and the 
direction of the variables over time that we expect to observe in each typical mode (see 
3.2.2). The Schumpeter Mark I sector is relatively open to the entrance of new or small 
firms. Therefore, we expect that new firm entry and the number of innovating firms will 
increase over time, and as a result the concentration of innovative activities will 
decrease. Malerba and Orsenigo (1997) term this process widening. 
 
In contrast, a typical Schumpeter Mark II sector is relatively closed to new or small 
innovators and works in favour of large innovators. Therefore, we expect to observe a 
decreasing trend in the contribution of new firms. The number of firms may be relatively 
stable (as shown in table 1) or even decrease over time, depending on the size of 
existing firms. This implies a rise in concentration of innovative activities in the sector 
which leads to relative stability particularly among big innovators. Malerba and Orsenigo 
(1997) term this deepening. 
 
Comparing the observed trends with the evolution of technological opportunities (see 
table 1) helps to reveal the dominant pattern. We stick to the three main periods defined 
in section 3. In order to smooth the trends and ignore short term fluctuations, we 
collapse the data, as shown in figure 3. The length of the first period is 14 years, but the 
length of both the second and third periods is 10 years. Therefore, we divide p1 into one 
introductory sub-period (p1-0) and two other sub- periods (p1-1, p1-2). This means that 
all three main periods cover 10 years with two 4-year sub periods at both sides and a 
two year gap in the middle, leaving out the introductory sub-period of p1-0. Using this 
periodization helps to control for the impact of change in technological opportunities on 
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the selected variables, and therefore helps to unravel the role of KBC in the dynamics of 
sectoral patterns of innovation. 
 
Figure 3: Periodization of the Analysis 
 
 
 
4.4.1 Concentration and number of innovators 
 
The top part of figure 4 shows the trend of concentration over time for different size 
groups using a corrected version of Herfindahl index of concentration. This measure is 
used to explore how the relative share of big vs. small innovators in the sector changes 
over time. 
 
Figure 4: Concentration of innovative activities (a & b) and number of innovative firms 
(c & d) by innovation size 
 
 
 
The advantage of this corrected version is that it controls for small sample bias 
(Corrocher et al., 2007). We repeated the indicator for different subset of companies 
defined by innovation size (for N<40, N<100, N>40, N>100 and All Companies: N is the 
number of patents each company holds) to check the robustness of the results in 
different size groups. The top left side of the figure 4(a) displays concentration (C) for 
large innovation size group and top right side of the figure 4(b) shows it for smaller 
sizes. Regardless of the size categories, all of the indicators present an overall U shape 
pattern reaching their lowest points in p1-2 or p2-1. The two lowest figures show the 
number of innovative firms over time, by innovation size. 
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According to these figures, concentration (C) decreases in p1 (and even up to p2-1 for 
larger groups). In parallel, firm numbers (F) increase in almost all size categories. High 
technological opportunities driven by high oil prices seem to have worked as a powerful 
incentive for smaller firms to catch-up with major innovators. The increasing number of 
innovative companies in all groups also confirms the key role of new innovators in p1. 
Their considerable share in innovative activities challenged the relative position of big 
existing innovators pushing down concentration. Another complementary mechanism for 
the increasing number of firms and decreasing concentration was the progressive 
outsourcing of oil operators from supply and service companies (Maleki, 2013). 
 
As oil prices collapsed in p2-1 and the declining trend continued in the second period, 
the upstream petroleum industry did not reward innovative efforts. Over p2, F slightly 
decreased and C took a clear upward trend. One reasonable explanation is the higher 
vulnerability of some smaller firms, when a continued low opportunity environment dries 
up their innovative efforts. Due to the high risk and uncertainty involved in innovative 
activities, many firms cut R&D investments in poor market conditions. As discussed in 
section 4.1, the number of patents has a negative trend in p2. Yet increasing 
concentration of innovative activities, combined with a reduction in the number of 
innovative firms, suggests vulnerability of smaller firms exiting from the system of 
innovation. Indeed, p2 is the only period with negative net entry. Furthermore, a wave of 
M&A activities, triggered by low oil prices in p2 provided a further contribution towards 
higher concentration. Nonetheless, acceleration of outsourcing strategies by oil 
operators smoothed the trend of concentration in p2, which otherwise would have been 
sharper. 
 
The beginning of the third and final period (p3) presents an interesting and puzzling 
pattern. By the end of p2 and the beginning of p3, a new wave of innovative entry is 
observable resulting in a sharp rise of F (fig 4d) in all size categories, with the exception 
of super big innovators (N>100) (fig 4c). This was driven by the jump in technological 
opportunities observed after p2-1. Although F transforms from a negative trend in p2 to 
a sharp positive trend in p3, there is no expected corresponding drop in C. In contrast, C 
continues its upward trend which is reinforced over p3. 
 
This pattern reflects the relative low and weakening share of new entrants in p3, 
compared to big incumbents (figs 4a & b). In addition, the short term jump of F before 
p3-1 (fig 4b) turned into a relatively stable trend in p3, whilst concentration gained 
momentum. 
 
These patterns suggest a fundamental difference between p1 and p3. On the one hand, 
high opportunity environments in both periods encourage new innovators to enter the 
sector - reflected in the rise of F. On the other hand, C presents an opposite trend - 
decreasing in p1, but increasing in p3. These different behaviours are explained by the 
changing nature of technological regimes, in particular the rise of KBC discussed in 
section 4.2. In particular, we observe that the increasing systemic complexity of the 
knowledge base during p3 was associated with a higher concentration of innovative 
activities. 
 
In sum, our results show that during p1, small innovators benefited from high 
opportunities because of low systemic complexity, which was no longer the case in p3. 
Systemic complexity in p3 increased the cognitive barriers to entry for small and 
newcomer companies. Although high technological opportunities emerged and were 
driven by knowledge recombination processes (see section 4.2), they could only be 
exploited by knowledgeable and technologically diversified companies, some of which 
possessed integrative and combinational capabilities. Small and new firms continued to 
innovate in specialized niche technical areas, but became less relevant in relative terms. 
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4.4.2 Share of new entry to the system of innovation 
 
This section analyses the ability of new innovators in comparison with incumbents to 
contribute to the development of the knowledge base of the industry. Table 2 shows the 
number of patents (by international patent family IPF) of existing and new firms in each 
sub-period; and also the new innovators' share of patents (NE) in each sub-period. This 
is measured for three different innovation sizes of firms (with minimum patent size of 1, 
5 and 10), in order to get insights about the role of size for successful entry. 
 
Table 2: New entries to the innovation system: by different innovation size 
 
 
 
According to table 2, the share of new entry during period 1 (p1) increases from about 
34.8 percent to 35.9, confirming a 1% rise in the chance of new innovators. Growth of 
new entries seems higher for bigger innovators (about 2% and 4% for 5 and 10 IPFs 
minimum size), suggesting the increasing possibility of moving up the hierarchy among 
larger firms. Overall, the new entry indicators confirm the increasing chance for new 
innovators over p1 for all firm sizes. 
 
The transition from p1 to p2 is accompanied by a 10% reduction of new entrants for all 
size ranges. The arrival of low opportunity conditions in p2 works against new entry, as 
expected returns on R&D are reduced. Over p2, when low innovation opportunity 
conditions were established and companies adjusted to the external shock, some of this 
loss of new entrants recovered. This is reflected in the rise of new entrants’ share of all 
size innovators. This is rather counter intuitive, because low opportunity conditions do 
not normally motivate new entries. 
One reasonable explanation, reinforced by data from Weston and Johnson (1999), is 
that new innovative companies emerged as a result of accelerated outsourcing of 
operators whereby part of innovation process transferred to a new class of agents 
(service companies). Consequently, we attribute the rise of new entries over p2 to the 
emergence of a new division of innovative labour in the industry reflecting also a new 
division of knowledge among industry participants. 
 
The distinction between short-term and long-term responses of the sectoral innovation 
system to low opportunity conditions is an interesting finding. The short-term response 
of industry to low opportunities was reduction of new entries. However, the long-term 
response was formation of a new division of knowledge, or more precisely a new 
industry architecture (Brusoni et al., 2009). This favoured new entrants and triggered 
new knowledge dynamics. Transition from the low opportunity conditions of p2 to high 
opportunity conditions in p3 amplified the number of entries, as reflected in the 
continued rise of NE for all size ranges from p2 to p3. 
 
Over p3, we observe a relative reduction of new entrants in all groups, to their lowest 
levels over the whole 1970-2005 period. In contrast to the high opportunity conditions of 
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p1 over which new entries experienced their maximum level, the possibility of new 
entries over p3 is most limited. Ceteris paribus, the standard theory of patterns of 
innovation predicts a positive relationship between opportunities and new entries. These 
predictions however are conditional on the nature of technological regimes. For 
example, high new entry is expected under low cumulativeness conditions when 
potential innovators are not at major disadvantage with respect to incumbent firms 
(Breschi and Malerba 2000). Our analysis in sections 4.2 and 4.3 suggests that the 
difference between p1 and p3 in terms of new entries can to a significant extent be 
attributed to the dynamics of KBC. New entrants are at a high disadvantage in p3 
compared to p1 because of the change in underlying technological regimes. The rise of 
systemic complexity over p3 involves higher cumulativeness, implying higher cognitive 
barriers to entry, which constrained the exploitation of existing technological 
opportunities by new and small companies in this period. 
 
4.5 Sectoral patterns of innovation and KBC 
 
So far, the dynamics of the sectoral pattern of innovation in the upstream petroleum 
industry has been analysed using three indicators over the main periods. Table 3 
summarizes the changing pattern of these indicators with each period characterised by 
dominant pattern. The arrows in table 3 specify the magnitude of changes in the 
indicators over that period, according to the data presented in previous sections. 
Accordingly, p1 is characterised as strong Mark I, because of a considerable reduction 
in the degree of concentration (C), a large increase in the number of firms (F) and the 
rise of new entrants (NE). 
 
The second period presents a pattern which is more similar to Mark II, although its 
intensity seems weak. C began a slight upward trend and F reduced to some extent, as 
technological opportunities were relatively low. Although NE shows an upward trend 
over p2, this can be explained by the increased reliance of oil operators on outsourced 
services, a trend driven by low oil prices (Weston and Johnson, 1999). In the absence of 
this structural change, higher concentration and a lower number of innovative firms and 
new entries would probably have been observed. Hence, this period could be labelled 
as Mark II, except for the effect of structural change on new entries. Combined with the 
results presented in section 4.2, these results suggest that KBC contributes to explain 
change in innovation pattern as the industry entered p2, because increased connectivity 
within the knowledge network meant larger incumbents were in a better position to 
exploit technological independencies. 
 
Table 3: Observed Schumpeterian patterns of innovation 
 
 
The signs of Schumpeter Mark II are considerably stronger when technological 
opportunities increase over p3 (as the patterns of indicators show in table 3). Although 
technological opportunities are high, new entries are reduced and the number of firms 
stays relatively stable. Most importantly, the upward trend of concentration accelerated. 
When the three indicators are combined, comparing table 1 and table 3 signals the 
emergence of a progressively stronger Mark II, in which the relative advantage of big 
operators coincides with higher KBC. The rise of technological complexity of the sector 
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was driven by more sophisticated upstream exploration and complex production 
projects. As a result, only a few big technologically advanced companies had access to 
the required range of sophisticated technologies and could operate these complex 
projects. 
 
Our results also suggest that change in technological opportunities tends to affect the 
pace of change in existing patterns of innovation. The existing pattern of innovation is 
weakened when changing from high to low opportunity (as observed over the transition 
from p1 to p2) and is reinforced when changing from low to high (as observed over the 
transition from p2 to p3). However, this evidence by itself is unable to explain the shift 
from Mark I to Mark II. This is best understood by looking at the two extremes of p1 and 
p3, when two different patterns of innovation are observable with high technological 
opportunities. If the concept of technological regimes is convincingly to explain the shifts 
in the mode of Schumpeterian pattern, other factors should be taken into account. We 
propose that systemic KBC is that candidate in the case of upstream petroleum. 
Reduction of systemic complexity over p1 is consistent with Schumpeter Mark I. When 
systemic complexity of the knowledge base increases in early p2, the features of Mark II 
emerge in the sector. Then, higher opportunities in p3 reinforce this pattern. 
 
These findings fit well with the propositions outlined in section 4.3. As predicted, the 
upstream sector seems to move toward Mark I over p1 and shift towards Mark II over 
p3. This leads us to posit a novel analytical framework which explains how the upstream 
petroleum industry evolved through different patterns of innovation in parallel with 
technological opportunities and KBC. The impact of the combination of these two 
dimensions of technological regimes on change of pace and mode of Schumpeterian 
pattern of innovation over the three periods is visualized in a 2x2 matrix in figure 5. 
 
Figure 5: Technological regimes and Schumpeterian patterns of innovation 
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The vertical axis specifies high vs. low technological opportunities and the horizontal 
axis represents the pace of systemic complexity. As argued in section 3, the dynamics 
of systemic complexity could favour the dominance of two different types of 
Schumpeterian pattern of innovation (Mark I on the left and Mark II on the right of the 
matrix differentiate these two types). Increasing (decreasing) technological opportunities 
tends to reinforce (weaken) the pace of existing pattern, whether it is Mark I or II, but do 
not alter its mode. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
This paper aimed to show how the changing nature of sectoral patterns of innovation is 
intrinsically related with the dynamics of technological regimes. We provide a threefold 
contribution. First, we propose a dynamic reading of the concept of technological 
regimes to understand structural transformations of an industry over time. Second, we 
conceptualize and put the notion of KBC at the centre of our analytical framework. Third, 
we propose a quantitative method using patent data in order to capture the dynamics of 
KBC and their relationship with sectoral patterns of innovation. 
 
Our focus is on the co-evolution among KBC, technological opportunities and sectoral 
patterns of innovation. Our evidence suggests that decreasing systemic complexity 
tends to be associated with Schumpeter Mark I, while the rise of systemic complexity 
implies a shift towards Mark II. Nonetheless, it is also evident from our findings that the 
Schumpeterian dichotomy is not completely adequate to capture the dynamics of 
complex sectoral innovation systems, as the third and last period of the study in 
upstream petroleum is not a typical Mark II, but rather a modified type in which a new 
class of dominant innovators emerge to cope with increasing technological complexity. 
We also argued that the dynamics of technological opportunities are not sufficient to 
explain this shift of mode, although they can explain changes in the pace or strength of 
existing Schumpeterian patterns. When the dynamics of technological opportunities are 
analysed in combination with those of KBC as two different dimensions of technological 
regimes, they convincingly explain the dynamics of Schumpeterian patterns both in 
terms of pace and mode. In other words, change in systemic complexity could alter the 
Schumpeterian mode, while a rise (or decline) of technological opportunities tends to 
weaken (or strengthen) the existing mode without altering it. Both small and new 
innovators could exploit increasing technological opportunities most when systemic 
complexity is low or decreasing. This resembles most of the features of a Schumpeter 
Mark I mode. In contrast, when systemic complexity dominates the sector, the rise of 
technological opportunities is relatively more beneficial to incumbent and big companies 
(some of which are system integrators). This situation characterizes a (modified) 
Schumpeter Mark II mode. 
 
Hence, while the nature of knowledge components underlying the sector may have not 
changed considerably, the intensity of interactions between knowledge components has 
progressively increased, leading to higher systemic complexity and knowledge 
cumulativeness of the sector in recent periods. This situation reinforced the relative 
position of big and incumbents compared to new firms and increased the barriers to 
entry. Put it differently, technical change was of a ‘competence-enhancing’ type 
(Tushman and Anderson, 1986) where incumbents have higher absorptive capacity 
(Cohen and Levinthal, 1989) to assimilate new but similar knowledge. High 
technological opportunities can reduce the gap between small and big innovators when 
systemic complexity is decreasing (Mark I). However, high technological opportunities 
are most likely to widen the gap between small and big innovators, if systemic 
complexity dominates the sector (Mark II). 
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In our analysis of the shift towards Mark II, sizeable innovators were not always 
incumbents, which make the sector structurally dynamic. A number of service 
companies emerged and played the role of knowledge connectors or integrators, helping 
incumbents to cope with excessive complexity. In this sense, our historical accounts 
together with Maleki (2013) suggest that the innovation pattern in p3 is not a typical 
Schumpeter Mark II, but a modified version of it. While in early p1, operators were major 
innovators holding about 35% of all patents, in p3 integrated service companies become 
dominant innovators holding more than 40% of patents. In addition, the distinction 
between innovation size and firm size is important, as sizable innovators are not 
necessarily the biggest players in the sector. Our analysis evidences that rise of the 
large integrated service companies as dominant innovators, whilst oil operators were 
relatively weakened, and new oil operators made little headway as innovators. 
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